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A HISTORY OF AUDITORS' INDEPENDENCE 
IN THE U.S. 
by 
Edward W. Younkins 
Wheeling College 
Wheeling, West Virginia 
Independence has long been a fundamental 
concept to the attest function of the accounting 
profession. Independence provides the profession 
with a philosophical and historical foundation. At 
one time independence was assumed to mean 
integrity, honesty, and objectivity. Another 
interpretation has referred to freedom from the 
control of those whose records are being reviewed. 
Independence has also been characterized as a state 
of mind and a matter of character. 
Thus, independence is considered to be the 
cornerstone of the profession. The CPA must not 
subordinate his or her judgment to clients, 
bankers, governmental agencies, etc. In addition, 
the CPA must avoid relationships which would be 
likely to impair objectivity, permit personal bias, or 
affect professional judgment. 
The ongoing debate over the independence 
concept with respect to certain service provided by 
CPAs, the strong prohibitions with respect to an 
auditor's relationship with clients, and the 
increased pressure for fuller disclosures in financial 
statements provide interest regarding the historical 
and philosophical evolution of the concept. Thus, 
the purpose of this article is to provide a summary 
of the historical development of independence in 
the United States as interpreted by various groups 
and individuals. This will be done through the 
discussion of the development of the independence 
concept throughout four separate time periods or 
eras. 
Early Recognition of the Concept: 1900-1925 
Concern in the United States regarding auditor 
independence grew more slowly than it did in 
England. The American Association of Public 
Accountants (AAPA) was established in 1887 and 
did not initially incorporate independence in its 
constitution or bylaws. 
By 1900, evidence of the development of the 
concept was beginning to appear in literature as 
seen in the following statement: 
A public accountant acknowledges no 
master but the public, and thus differs 
from the bookkeeper, whose acts and 
statements are dictated by his 
employers. A public accountant's 
certificate, though addressed to 
president or directors, is virtually made 
to the public, who are actually or 
prospectively stockholders. He should 
have ability, varied experience and 
undoubted integrity.1 
In 1907 the bylaws of the AAPA were amended 
to recognize the importance of avoiding 
inconsistent or incompatible occupations. The 
following year Elijah W. Sells made the following 
comment regarding independence: 
The position of the public accountant 
in respect to corporations and their 
management is always an independent 
Continued on Page 22 
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one. Unlike the attorney, he is not 
expected to make out a case. The 
character of the service he renders is 
impersonal.2 
During the first quarter of the twentieth century 
the most debated ethical issue was whether or not 
accountants should advertise. Subsequently, the 
main issue has been auditor independence. 
However, an incident in 1915 is noteworthy since 
it anticipated the intense debates to occur years 
later on the subject of independence. A question 
arose regarding the propriety of a public 
accounting firm auditing statements in which a 
member of the firm was also the internal auditor. 
The early "state of mind" concept of auditor 
independence meant that client-accountant 
relations should be such that the auditor's findings 
would be influenced only by the facts. Later, the 
concept was to evolve into an "appearance to 
others" concept which places less emphasis on 
actions and more on relationships. 
Development of The Concept: 1926-1939 
In 1926, the report of the American Institute of 
Accountants' Committee on Professional Ethics 
posed the question of whether or not it is ethical for 
a CPA who is a director of a company to also certify 
the company's balance sheet. A 1928 editorial in 
the Journal of Accountancy answered this question 
as follows: 
The accountant should be so utterly 
divorced from financial or other 
participation in the success or failure of 
an undertaking under audit that no one 
could even point an accusing finger, 
however unjustly, and allege the 
possibility of bias.3 
Another editorial in the same issue addressed the 
question of an auditor who was also a stockholder.4 
Although there had been a growing number of 
references to the independence of auditors in the 
professional literature, the word "independence" 
was still absent from the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Although several rules already adopted 
were designed to implicitly strengthen 
independence, there was an absence of explicit 
discussions regarding relationships with clients that 
might tend to impair independence or appear to do 
so. 
At the American Institute of Accounting's 1931 
annual meeting, Frederick H. Hurdman, 
immediate past president of the Institute, 
introduced the following resolution: 
Whereas the relations between a 
client, in the form of a corporation, and 
the auditor for the corporation should 
be one of entire independence, and 
Whereas, it does not appear to be 
practicable for the auditor consistently 
to hold a dual relationship, as an 
auditor and executive of the 
corporation, and 
Whereas, the public interest and 
confidence will best be preserved by a 
complete separation of these two 
functions, therefore be it 
Resolved, that the maintenance of a 
dual relationship as director or officer of 
a corporation, while acting as auditor of 
that corporation, is against the best 
interests of the public and the 
profession and tends to destroy that 
independence of action considered 
essential in the relationship between 
client and auditor.5 
After a lengthy discussion, the resolution was 
referred to the Committee on Professional Ethics. 
However, the resolution was not acted upon by the 
Institute in 1931 or 1932. 
The Securities Act of 1933 required a public 
accountant or certified public accountant to express 
an opinion regarding the financial statements that 
accompany a registration statement. Additionally, 
there was concern for the independence of the 
auditors. A rule was adopted on July 6, 1933 which 
said that any CPA or public accountant will not be 
recognized as independent if such an accountant is 
not in fact independent. 
Unless the Commission otherwise 
directs, such accountant will not be 
considered independent with respect to 
any person in whom he has any interest, 
directly or indirectly, or with whom he is 
connected as an officer, agent, 
employee, promoter, underwriter, 
trustee, partner, director, or person 
performing similar function.6 
Consequently, the concept of auditing 
independence was evolving from one of integrity 
and honesty with respect to fraud detection to one 
of fraud detection plus the objective application of 
accounting principles to describe the true economic 
and financial position and results of a firm. The 
emerging objectivity concept of independence can 
be found in the following paragraph from an 
editorial in a 1933 issue of the Journal of 
Accountancy. 
Continued 
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The public accountant has his 
impartial status in this great and 
thrilling game of business. He knows 
the rules. He knows the players. All the 
spectators up in the grandstand on the 
bleachers will rely on him, if he be a 
true umpire at heart, to see that the 
game is conducted fairly and that every 
one who paid the price of admission 
shall have a fair deal. The fact of an 
umpire does not indicate any moral 
obliquity in any player. An umpire is 
needed because he can see both sides 
when often the players, because of their 
position in the game, can see only their 
own.7 
While the SEC rule prohibited any financial 
interest, the AIA passed a resolution in 1934 
prohibiting a "substantial financial interest." 
Finally, in 1936 the SEC rule was amended to agree 
with the AIA position. Thereafter, disputes 
developed over the meaning of "substantial.'' This 
eventually led the SEC to delete the word in 1950. 
A 1935 article by A. C. Littleton asked for more 
"independence in fact" from auditors.8 Littleton 
called for amendment of the federal securities act 
and the securities exchange act to give a larger 
degree of real independence to public accountants. 
Real independence is necessary to fulfill the 
auditor's function as an unofficial representative 
of the investing public. He stated that it was the 
public accountant's already well-developed sense of 
professional independence that qualifies him for 
greater real independence as a "quasi-public" 
representative of the interests of scattered and 
inarticulate investors. However, more public 
support is needed to accomplish this task. 
Evidently, it was the SEC that exerted leadership 
during the 1930s concerning the determination of 
what constituted independence. This was 
evidenced by its issuance of Accounting Series 
Release No. 2 in 1937. This was the first release to 
describe specific cases in which individual 
accountants had been found to be not, 
independent. The first release referred to a case in 
which an accountant was not independent because 
he owned stock in a client corporation, the value of 
which accounted for more than one percent of his 
personal fortunes.9 
Amplification and Growth of the Concept: 1940-
1959 
It was not until 1940 that the AIA adopted a rule 
of professional conduct regarding financial 
independence to replace its 1934 resolution. The 
rule read as follows: 
A member or an associate shall not 
express his opinion on financial 
statements of any enterprise financed in 
whole or in pan by public distribution 
of securities, if he is himself the actual 
or beneficial owner of a substantial 
financial interest in the enterprise or if 
he is committed to acquire such an 
interest; nor shall a member or an 
associate express his opinion on 
financial statements which are used as a 
basis for credit, if he is himself the 
actual or beneficial owner of a 
substantial financial interest in the 
enterprise or if he is committed to 
acquire such interest, unless he discloses 
his financial interest in his report.10 
In 1942, modifications of the above rule on 
financial independence were made. Independence 
was now seen to be impaired if the auditor owned 
or was committed to buy a financial interest in the 
enterprise which was substantial in relation to its 
capital or to his own personal fortune. In addition, 
the rule was expanded to incorporate financial 
interests of his immediate family. These changes 
were in accord with various earlier SEC decisions.11 
At about this same time, the SEC was issuing 
Accounting Series Releases regarding auditing 
independence. In 1942, Accounting Series Release 
No. 22 quoted an opinion of its Chief Accountant, 
William W. Werntz as follows: 
When an accountant and his client, 
directly or through an affiliate, have 
entered into an agreement of indemnity 
which seeks to assure to the accountant 
immunity from liability for his own 
negligent acts, whether of omission or 
commission, it is my opinion that one of 
the major stimuli to objective and 
unbiased consideration of the problems 
encountered in a particular engagement 
is removed or greatly weakened. Such 
condition must frequently include a 
departure from the standards of 
objectivity and impartiality which the 
concept of independence implies.12 
Continued 
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This same release also contains an excellent 
summary of the SEC's attitude toward the general 
question of independence. It states that the main 
objective of total independence is to assure the 
impartiality and objectivity needed for fair 
consideration of problems arising in an audit. Any 
circumstances that might be likely to bias the mind 
of the auditor may be considered evidence of the 
lack of independence.13 
Then, in 1944, Accounting Series Release No. 47 
listed and summarized twenty rulings on auditors' 
independence in specific cases. These ranged from 
fairly clear-cut situations to other situations where 
it was not very clear that the relationships were 
likely to impair independence. Several situations in 
which independence was found to be impaired are 
summarized below: 
1. Both an accountant and a business associate 
loaned money to the registrant. In addition, 
the accountant's son was an officer of the 
registrant. 
2. The accountant made an advance to . the 
registrant to finance a new department. 
3. The registrant could not pay the 
accountant's fee and instead pledged shares 
of its stock to assure that the fee would be 
paid. Furthermore, the accountant was 
given an option to buy the pledged stock at 
market price at the option date. 
4. The accountant was a shareholder and the 
treasurer of a company that sold a portion of 
the registrant's products. 
5. The partner's son was the chief accountant 
and assistant treasurer of the registrant. In 
addition, the son lived with the father.14 
It was not until 1947 that a specific definition of 
independence was formulated by the AIA. The 
AIA defined independence as a state of mind. It is 
an impartial attitude regarding the auditor's 
findings. The auditor should be able to render 
judgment unaffected by any self-interest which 
could influence his opinion. Key characteristics of 
the independence concept thus include honest 
disinterest, unbiased judgment, objective 
consideration of facts, and judicial impartiality. 
Independence "in fact" is emphasized in this 
document. 
The AIA also noted that rules of conduct only 
dealt with objective standards and accordingly 
could not assure independence. Since 
independence is a state of mind, its existence is at a 
much deeper level than the visible display of 
standards.15 
A rather philosophical description of the 
independence concept was offered in 1950 by 
Edward B. Wilcox, a past president of the AIA. As 
seen in the following quotation, Wilcox implied 
that there are segments of public accounting that 
do not require independence on the part of the 
CPA: 
That part of public accounting which 
does clearly require independence 
relates to the expression of an expert 
opinion on representations in financial 
statements. The purpose of the expert 
opinion is to add to the credibility of the 
statements. Those who rely on this 
credibility are apt to be creditors or 
investors, or sometimes employees, 
customers or governmental agencies. As 
in other areas of public accounting, the 
expert incurs professional obligations of 
an ethical nature to do a sound, 
competent job. But he also incurs more 
than that. He incurs an obligation to his 
unknown audience for integrity. He 
must protect them even though he does 
not know who they are, and he must do 
so even when it means opposing and 
denying the wishes of those who have 
employed him, and who he knows may 
cease to do so. This is independence.l6 
As noted earlier, in 1950 the SEC amended its 
rule on independence by omitting the word 
"substantial" from the phrase "any substantial 
interest." This change was prompted because the 
SEC was tired of debates regarding the essence of a 
"substantial" financial interest. Interestingly, it 
was not until 1962 that the AICPA moved to 
disallow the direct financial interest or material 
indirect financial interest in a firm being audited 
by a member. Thus, during a twelve year period, a 
double standard existed. No direct financial 
interest was allowed for SEC engagements and no 
substantial direct financial interest was permitted 
for non-SEC engagements. 
Shortly after the SEC introduced its restriction, 
efforts were made by some members of the Illinois 
Society of CPAs to broaden the scope of their rules 
of ethics. In 1954 a new rule was adopted in that 
state to prohibit a member, or a firm of which a 
member was a partner, from expressing an opinion 
on the financial statements of any organization if 
the member, his partners, or their immediate 
families living in the same household, had a direct 
Continued 
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or indirect financial interest in the organization in 
question. It was the most rigorous rule on financial 
interests, to that date, to have been adopted by any 
professional society of accountants. The purpose of 
the Illinois Society was clearly to raise standards of 
professional conduct.17 The adoption of the rule 
was apparently in recognition of the need to 
preserve the "appearance of independence" as 
well as independence in fact. 
Refinement and Maturation of the Concept: 1960-
Present 
A 1960 article by Sharaf and Mautz suggested 
that independence is a three-dimensional concept 
with each dimension being affected by the complex 
of a social, economic, and personal relationship 
encountered by the auditor in his professional 
work. An auditor must be free from restriction or 
bias in all three dimensions concurrently if he is to 
be totally independent. These three dimensions of 
independence are: 
1. Programming independence: This is 
freedom from undue influence in the choice 
of audit procedures and techniques and in 
the extent to which they are applied. The 
auditor must have freedom to develop his 
own program with respect to the steps 
included and the amount of work to be 
undertaken. 
2. Investigative independence: This is freedom 
from influence in the choice of activities, 
areas, managerial policies, etc. to be 
examined. No legitimate information 
source should be unavailable to the auditor. 
3. Reporting independence: This is freedom 
from undue influence in the statement of 
facts revealed during the examination of, in 
the expression of opinions, or 
recommendations resulting from the 
examination. 
Sharaf and Mautz go on to note that influence 
and control can exist even without apparent outside 
pressure. An accountant's prejudice or personal 
bias, his desire for social or economic success, etc., 
may in effect impair his independence. Thus, the 
detection of impaired independence is difficult in 
many cases. It is therefore important to have guides 
that can help the accountant evaluate his own 
situation.18 
Also, in 1960, the American Institute's 
committee on professional ethics proposed an 
amendment of the rules of conduct to prohibit any 
member from serving as an employee or director of 
a firm for which he was the auditor or from having 
any financial interest in such a firm. After a long 
and vigorous debate, the proposal was voted on 
and passed at the Institute's 1961 annual meeting. 
In effect, the rule moved the AICPA closer to the 
SEC position.19 
In 1961, Mautz and Sharaf published a 
monograph called The Philosophy of Auditing 
which included a critical examination of the 
concept of independence. One important aspect of 
independence addressed was whether the rendering 
of management services to a client: is likely to 
impair a CPA's independence in expressing an 
opinion on the financial statements. 
Management services tended to cloud the CPA's 
appearance of independence in his capacity as 
auditor. They recommended that the audit 
function by strongly separated from the other 
services offered by an accounting firm.20 
Practitioners were disturbed to learn that the 
propriety of offering management services was 
being challenged. The Institute's committee on 
professional ethics believed that an authoritative 
opinion on this question was needed to guide the 
membership. Therefore, in 1963 the committee 
issued its Opinion No. 12 on independence. The 
opinion stated that there was no likelihood of a 
conflict of interest arising from the offering of 
management advisory services and tax services. It 
was, therefore, ethical to offer such services.21 
This statement did not satisfy the academic 
accountants. One, Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., was 
concerned that the opinion offered no empirical 
evidence to support its contentions. Schulte thus 
conducted a survey and reported his results in the 
July, 1963 issue of The Accounting Review, He 
mailed questionnaires to four selected groups: (1) 
research and financial analysts of brokerage firms; 
(2) commercial loan and trust officers of banks; (3) 
investment officers of insurance companies; and (4) 
investment officers of domestic mutual funds. 
Schulte found that ninety-seven percent of the 
responding third parties attached a special 
importance to the CPA's audit independence. In 
addition, forty-five percent believed that 
management consulting did tend to impair audit 
independence and fifty-five percent believed that it 
did not.22 
These findings were sharply criticized by Carey 
and Doherty. They state that: 
Nowhere in the questionnaire or the 
article interpreting it is there a 
definition of the term 'management 
consulting.' This term may well evoke a 
reaction different from that evoked by 
'management services,' which is 
commonly used by the profession itself. 
Continued 
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In any event, it cannot be assumed that 
all the respondents to the questionnaire 
were familiar with the specific services 
offered by CPA firms as aids to 
management. The respondents may 
have read into the question types of 
'consulting' which in fact are not 
commonly engaged in by CPAs. 
It is difficult to believe that 
reasonable observers—stockholders, 
creditors or other users of financial 
statements, or the business public 
generally—would see any conflict of 
interest in the fact that the auditor, in 
addition to giving an opinion on the 
financial statements, also applied his 
technical knowledge and skill to the 
improvement of management 's 
planning, control and decision-making 
processes.23 
On the other hand, it is sometimes suggested 
that in providing management services the CPA 
effectively becomes an employee of the client and 
loses hs independence as an auditor. One response 
to this charge runs as follows. The essence of an 
employee is his dependence on management. If 
fired, he has no job. However, neither the 
consultant, nor the auditor is out of a job if he loses 
a client. Both the auditor and the consultant have 
economic independence with respect to their 
client.24 
In 1966, Abraham J. Briloff conducted a survey 
which supported the results of the Schulte study 
previously mentioned. Briloff's questionnaire was 
sent to financial personnel, practicing accountants, 
and academic accountants. Fifty-three percent of 
the responding financial personnel believed that 
the provision of management services by CPAs 
detracted from the significance of their audit 
opinions.25 
In response to such confusion, the Institute 
appointed a special ad hoc committee to study the 
problem. The committee was chaired by Malcolm 
M. Devore. The committee stated that it had found 
no substantive evidence to indicate that the 
provision of management services has, in fact, 
impaired independence. However, it also found no 
empirical evidence to dispute Schulte's findings 
linking management services with an "apparent" 
lack of independence. The committee made several 
noteworthy recommendations. One involved the 
issuance of two statements or position papers 
regarding (1) the nature of management services 
offered by a CPA and (2) the role of CPAs in 
rendering those services. A second noteworthy 
suggestion was the use of audit committees, 
consisting of outside directors, to choose the 
company's auditors and to determine questions 
relating to the appearance of independence. In 
addition, the CPAs should report periodically to 
the audit committee regarding all services 
rendered. This reporting would be done prior to 
the committee's selection of the firm's auditors.26 
A 1968 article by Walter Kell classified 
management services into "accounting" and 
"administrative" services. According to Kell, 
accounting-based services, such as budgeting and 
inventory control, evolve naturally from the audit 
engagement and the CPA's familiarity with the 
client's information system. Kell believed that the 
public accepts these services as legitimate concerns 
of the independent auditor. Administrative-based 
services such as market surveys and plant layout are 
outside the scope of the audit and extend far 
beyond the client's information system. Kell 
contends that there is no conflict between the 
performance of accounting services and audit 
independence but that the rendering of 
administrative services could possibly affect such 
independence. He suggests the establishment of an 
echics rule identifying the provision of 
administrative services to an audit client as 
incompatible with independence.27 
Accounting Series Release No. 126 was issued in 
1972. This release covered several areas including: 
1. The provision of guidelines; for determining 
the existence of independence; 
2. A listing of example situations in which 
independence could be challenged; 
3. A statement that the basic consideration in 
management service activities was whether 
the client appears to be completely 
dependent upon the CPA's judgment and 
skill or is reliant only to the extent that is 
customary with respect to consultation 
advice; 
4. A statement that systems design is a proper 
function of a public accountant and that 
computer programming is an aspect of 
systems design and does not constitute a 
bookkeeping service; 
5. A statement that when unpaid fees to the 
accountant become material relative to the 
current audit fee, a question may arise 
regarding the accountant's independence; 
and 
6. A statement that joint business ventures 
with clients, limited partnership 
agreements, investments in supplies or 
Continued 
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customer companies, and rental of blocks of 
computer time to a client would adversely 
affect independence.28 
In 1973, the AICPA adopted new rules of 
conduct (Rule 101). This was modified slightly in 
1978 and has remained unchanged since. 
Conclusion 
Independence is the sine qua non of professional 
auditors. It has been a major concern of auditors and 
users of audit reports since the early days of the 
profession. The SEC has had an important 
influence on the accounting professions' emerging 
standards of independence. Specifically, the 
responsibility of the SEC was to determine 
independence in specific cases. It therefore 
gravitated toward a practical definition of the 
concept which stressed the importance of observed 
behavior and relationships. 
For the most part, the accounting profession has 
relied upon a theoretical definition of 
independence and has used phrasers such as "a state 
of mind," an "attitude of impartiality," etc. The 
profession in the United States is now dealing in a 
more realistic manner with the practical aspects of 
the concept. As shown in this article, independence 
has been and still is the historical and philosophical 
foundation of the accounting profession. 
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